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What is a “Technical Regulation” in the TBT Agreement?  
Abstract: 
One important issue arising from EC-Seal Products is what constitutes a technical regulation 
in the TBT Agreement. This article argues that the Appellate Body’s analytical approach to 
this issue has led to an arbitrary conclusion in EC- Seal Products. The article further 
examines to what extent PPMs, especially Non-product-related PPMs, are covered by the 
TBT Agreement. The article concludes that an important question to be answered is what 
special characteristics of a technical regulation distinguish it from other regulations and make 
it subject to more detailed obligations in the TBT Agreement. 
I. Introduction  
In US – Clove Cigarettes, the WTO Appellate Body observed that the TBT Agreement and 
the GATT 1994 overlap and share similar objectives.1 At the heart, both the TBT Agreement 
and the GATT 1994 aim at striking a balance described by the Appellate Body as ‘on the one 
hand, the desire to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and, on the 
other hand, the recognition of Members’ right to regulate’. Thus, the GATT 1994 is relevant 
context for the interpretation of the TBT Agreement.2 That being said, the TBT Agreement is 
a specialized legal regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures. In EC – Asbestos, 
the Appellate Body emphasized that the TBT Agreement does not cover all internal measures 
covered by Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.3  
Moreover, the TBT Agreement imposes obligations on WTO Members that ‘seem to be 
different from, and additional to, the obligations imposed on Members under the GATT 
1994.4  The fundamental obligation under the GATT 1994 is non-discrimination. There are 
virtually no constraints on product standards that accord with the national treatment 
                                                        
1 United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove Cigarettes), 
Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R, 24 April 2012, at para 91.  
2 Ibid, para 100.  
3 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products , Report of the 
Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R,  5 April 2001, at para 77.  
4 Ibid,at  para 80. For a detailed analysis of how the TBT Agreement is different from and additional to the 
GATT 1994, see Ming Du, “Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-
discrimination to Harmonization”, 6 Chinese Journal of International Law  (2007), pp. 269  et sqq., at p. 278. 
obligation in the GATT 1994 even if the standards raise the costs of foreign suppliers 
disproportionately and thus have the effect of insulating domestic firms from foreign 
competition.5 By comparison, the disciplines on product standards under the TBT Agreement 
move beyond the non-discrimination principle. This is the case, for example, with regard to 
Article 2.2.6 Different from the necessity test under Article XX of the GATT 1994 which is to 
rescue a measure that has already been found to violate some substantive GATT obligations, 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement imposes a positive obligation on all WTO Members. Even 
if a product standard at issue is not discriminatory in manner or in effect, it may still violate 
Article 2.2 simply because the standard unreasonably burdens international trade for the 
attainment of a legitimate policy objective.7 In addition, the TBT Agreement has moved 
beyond the negative integration legal tools such as the national treatment obligation and 
incorporated positive integration tools such as harmonization, mutual recognition and 
equivalence. For example, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO members to use 
relevant international standards as a basis for their municipal technical regulations unless they 
are inappropriate or ineffective. 
Because the TBT Agreement is a specialized legal regime that imposes some special 
obligations on WTO Members when they adopt a special class of measures, the regulatory 
scope of the TBT Agreement is an important issue. If a contested measure does not fall into 
the sphere of the TBT Agreement, it will not be scrutinized under the TBT agreement in the 
first place. The TBT Agreement defines its scope of application primarily in Article 1 and 
Annex 1, making it clear that it applies to technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures and to all products, with the exception of purchasing specifications 
prepared by the governmental bodies and SPS measures. Annex 1.1 defines a “technical 
regulation” as follows: 
Documents which lay down product characteristics or their related processes 
                                                        
5 John J. Barcelo III, “Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment- the GATT and the Uruguay Round 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement”,  27 Cornell International Law Journal  (1995), pp. 755 et sqq., at p. 
761; Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics,  1994), at p. 45. 
6 Article 2.2 provides: ‘Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, 
technical regulations shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create’.  
7 Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Turk, “Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law 
after Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines”, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), pp. 199 et sqq., at p. 
217. 
and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, 
with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method. 
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body set out a three-prong criterion that a measure must 
meet to fall within the definition of a “technical regulation”. First, the measure must lay down 
one or more product characteristics. Second, the measure must apply to an identifiable 
product or group of products. Third, the compliance with the product characteristics laid 
down in the document must be mandatory. 8 Prior to the EC – Seal Products case, the 
Appellate Body sided with the panels in almost all TBT disputes that the measures at issue set 
out product characteristics.9 In EC – Seal Products, there was no controversy about whether 
the measure applied to identifiable products, nor about whether it was mandatory. Instead, the 
major controversy centered on whether the EC seal regime has laid down one or more 
product characteristics. Part II of the article reflects on the Appellate Body’s analytical 
approach to this issue. Moreover, one unsettled question concerning the regulatory scope of 
the TBT Agreement is the extent to which production and process methods (PPMs) fall under 
the purview of “technical regulation”.10 Part III reviews the Appellate Body’s brief comments 
on this issue in EC – Seal Products and makes some suggestions on how this issue could be 
dealt with in future WTO disputes. Part IV concludes the article.  
II. Has the EC Seal Regime Laid down Product Characteristics?  
According to the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, the heart of the definition of a technical 
regulation is that a document must lay down “product characteristics”. Product characteristics 
include not only any objectively definable features and qualities intrinsic to the product, such 
as a product’s composition, size, hardness, flammability and density, but also “distinguishing 
marks” of a product, such as the means of identification, the presentation and the appearance 
of a product.11 Terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements are good 
                                                        
8 EC – Asbestos, supra note 3,  paras 66-70. It should be noted that in EC – Asbestos, the phrase ‘their related 
processes and production methods (PPMs)’ were  not at issue. To what extent PPMs are covered in the definition 
of technical regulation is discussed in part III.  
9 Emily S. Fuller, Alan Yanovich, Sally S. Laing and Stephen S. Kho, “Refining What Qualifies as WTO 
Technical Regulation”, 30 July 2014, available on the internet at 
<http://www.law360.com/articles/561813/refining-what-qualifies-as-wto-technical-regulation> (last accessed on 
5 May 2015).  
10 Joost Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO ‘Missing the Boat’? ” in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and 
Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 199 et sqq., at p. 210. 
11 EC– Asbestos , supra note 3, at para 67. 
examples of the latter category. In addition, product characteristics may be prescribed in 
either a positive or a negative form.12 The document may provide, positively, that product 
must possess certain characteristics, or the document may require, negatively, that products 
must not possess certain characteristics.  
In EC – Asbestos, the measure at issue was a French ban prohibiting any use of asbestos and 
products containing asbestos. There are two distinctive features about the French ban. First, it 
is not only a prohibition of asbestos fibres. It also banned products that contain asbestos 
fibres. The EC argued that a measure banning a product cannot be equated with a measure 
that specifies that same product’s characteristics. The Appellate Body agreed that the 
prescription of product characteristics must be distinguished from a pure product ban. If the 
measure consisted only of a prohibition of asbestos fibres, it might not constitute a technical 
regulation.13 But the French ban at issue also banned products that contain asbestos fibres. 
Formulated negatively, the ban effectively prescribes certain objective features of all 
products, that is, they should not contain asbestos fibres.14 After EC – Asbestos, it has been 
settled that if a measure strictly prohibits market access for a given product as such, such a 
measure does not constitute a technical regulation; if market access for a given class of 
products is made dependent on the existence or absence of given product characteristics, then 
this measure constitute a technical regulation. 15  Second, the French ban is not a total 
prohibition of asbestos fibres. It contains certain exceptions, permitting the use of certain 
products containing chrysotile asbestos fibres for a limited duration and subject to 
compliance with strict administrative requirements. The Panel concluded that the prohibition 
part of the French Decree is not a “technical regulation” but the exceptions part is. The 
Appellate Body reversed the panel and held that the prohibitions part and the exceptions part 
of the decree should be considered as a unified whole because the exceptions define the scope 
of the prohibitions and they would have no legal meaning unless they operated in conjunction 
with a general prohibition.16 Viewing the measure at an integrated whole, the Appellate Body 
saw that the French measure lays down characteristics for all products that contain asbestos.17  
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13 Ibid, at para 71.  
14 Ibid, at para 72.  
15 Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law, and Legal 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at p. 291. 
16 EC– Asbestos, supra note 3, at para 64. 
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At first sight, the structure of the EU seal regime in EC – Seal Products is very similar to the 
French measure in EC – Asbestos in two aspects. First, the French measure in EC – Asbestos 
bans the importation of not only asbestos fibres but also products that contain asbestos fibres. 
Similarly, the EU seal regime prohibits the placing on the EU market of both pure seal 
products and seal – containing products. Second, both the French measure in EC – Asbestos 
and the EU seal regime in EC – Seal Products are not a total prohibition, but include both 
prohibitive and permissive elements. In essence, the EU seal regime prescribes that the 
placing on the EU market of seal products (including pure seal products and seal-containing 
products) shall be allowed only under either of the three conditions: first, the seal products 
result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities (IC 
hunts) and contribute to their subsistence; second, seal products are derived from marine 
resource management hunts (MRM hunts) and are not being placed on the market for 
commercial reasons; and third, the import by travelers to the extent that they are not for 
commercial reasons. Even though there was not an explicit general ban on seal products like 
the French ban on Asbestos, the EU seal regime operated to the same effects as the French 
ban in EC – Asbestos, i.e., seal and seal-containing products are prohibited unless one of the 
exceptions applies. Following EC – Asbestos, the Panel in EC – Seal Products highlighted the 
fact that “the prohibition on seal-containing products under the EU seal regime lays down a 
product characteristic in the negative from by requiring that all products not contain seal” and 
concluded that the EC seal regime falls into the ambit of the TBT Agreement.18  
To many WTO commentators’ surprise, the Appellate Body reversed the panel. 19  The 
Appellate Body emphasized that the determination of whether a measure constitutes a 
technical regulation must be made in the light of the characteristics of the measure at issue 
and the circumstances of the case. A Panel must carefully examine the design and operation 
of the measure while seeking to identify its “integral and essential” aspects. It is these 
features of the measure that are to be accorded the most weight for purpose of characterizing 
the measure. The ultimate conclusion as to the legal characterization of the measure must be 
made in respect of the measure as a whole.20  
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Products), Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, 18 June 2014,  at para 5.25. 
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Applying this overall analytical approach to the facts, the Appellate Body pointed out that the 
Panel’s error was that its conclusion rested on its assessment of a single component of the 
measure, i.e., the prohibition of seal-containing products laid down a product characteristic in 
the negative form. The Panel, however, failed to conduct a holistic assessment of other 
relevant parts of the EU seal regime, particularly the permissive elements of the EU seal 
regime.21 As described earlier, the prohibition of seal products is subject to conditions based 
on criteria relating to the identity of the hunter, or the type or purpose of the hunt from which 
the product is derived. Different from EC – Asbestos, where it is uncontested that the 
exceptions part of the French ban laid down product characteristics 22 , the permissive 
elements of the EU seal regime, such as permitting Inuit killing seals, could not be viewed as 
product characteristics in the sense of TBT Annex 1.1.23  Another argument against the 
Panel’s analysis is that it makes the reference in the first sentence of TBT Annex 1.1 to 
“product characteristics or their related processes and production methods” pleonastic. 
Following the Panel’s approach, any PPM (seals killed by Inuit in EC – Seal Products) would 
lay down product characteristic.24 Moreover, it is indisputable that another aspect of the EU 
seal regime, the prohibition of pure seal products, does not prescribe any product 
characteristics.25 
Being a multi-faceted measure, the EU seal regime contains both prohibitive and permissive 
elements. While some elements lay down product characteristics, others condition market 
access on factors not related to product characteristics. How to decide whether or not the EU 
seal regime is a technical regulation? The Appellate Body analyzes the weight and relevance 
of the “essential and integral” elements of the measure and makes and following conclusion:  
When the prohibitive aspects of the EU seal regime are considered in the light of the 
IC and MRM exceptions, it becomes apparent that the measure is not concerned with 
banning the placing on the EU market of seal products as such. Instead, it establishes 
the conditions for placing seal products on the EU market based on criteria relating to 
the identity of the hunter or the type or purpose of the hunt from which the product is 
derived. We view this as the main feature of the measure. That being so, we do not 
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consider that the measure as a whole lays down product characteristics.26  
It is probably only apparent to the Appellate Body why the main feature of the measure is to 
establish market access conditions unrelated to product characteristics, rather than lay down 
product characteristics in the negative form with some exceptions. The Appellate Body 
concluded that the prohibition on the products containing seal is derivative or ancillary of the 
three (IC/MRM/Travelers) market access conditions.27 But this judgment seems to be rather 
arbitrary. As the Appellate Body acknowledged, the purpose of the EC ban on seal products is 
to prevent moral outrage at seal suffering. However, the purpose of the exceptions is to allow 
the preservation of Inuit culture and so on. Then, how can the purpose of public moral 
protection be derivative or ancillary of other purposes? Isn’t it more plausible that the EU 
first conceived of the ban to address the moral concerns about inhumane killing of seals, and 
only then realized that it wanted the IC exception and the others? If, as the Appellate Body 
argued, the exceptions which established the conditions for placing seal products on the EU 
market are the main feature of the EU seal regime, then why should the necessity test in 
Article XX (a) be assessed in relation to the public moral objective of the ban, rather than 
directly in relation to the objectives of the exceptions such as the IC hunts?  
Granted, the Appellate Body provided several reasons to support its conclusion, mainly 
through identifying different features of the EU seal regime and the French ban in EC – 
Asbestos. For example, in EC – Asbestos, asbestos-containing products were regulated 
because of their carcinogenic properties. By contrast, the EU seal regime does not prohibit 
seal-containing products because they contain seal as an input.28 The difficulty of verifying 
precisely whether a particular product contains seal as an input was understood by the 
Appellate Body as suggesting that the regulation of the seal-containing products is not an 
equally important feature of the EU seal regime in operation as the case for the regulation of 
products containing asbestos in EC – Asbestos. 29  But it is difficult to see how these 
differences somehow concealed arguably the most important effect of the EU seal regime: 
seal-containing products, which constituted the majority of imported seal products, are not 
permitted to access the EU market unless they meet certain criteria relating to the identity of 
the hunter or the type or purpose of the hunt. Moreover, as the Appellate Body acknowledged 
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in the necessity analysis under Article XX, despite the fact that IC and MRM hunts also lead 
to inhumanely killed seals which contradict the asserted animal welfare purpose, the EU seal 
regime has made a net positive contribution to reducing EU and global demand for seal 
products and the incidence of inhumanely killed seals. 30 The prohibitive and permissive 
elements of the EU seal regime are really the two sides of the same coin and the 
characterization of the measure could be made either way, depending on the perspective of 
the beholder. It is not entirely clear to the readers why the Appellate Body emphasized the 
permissive element of the EU measure, whilst regarding the prohibitive elements as 
derivative or ancillary to the former.    
The Appellate Body report of EC – Seal Products showed that the regulatory scope of the 
TBT Agreement is likely to be narrower than people previously thought.31 According to the 
Appellate Body, mainly because the exceptions part of the EC seal regime (permissive 
elements) does not lay down product characteristics, the EU seal regime as a whole does not 
lay down product characteristics.  This may mean that, assuming PPM issues are not 
implicated, the exceptions part may also have to lay down at least some product 
characteristics in order to fall into the ambit of the TBT Agreement in future disputes. In EC 
– Seal Products, after concluding that the EC seal regime was not a technical regulation, the 
Appellate Body advised: 
[In this case] we have focused on the text and the immediate context… as well as on 
previous jurisprudence by the Appellate Body. In future cases, depending on the 
nature of the measure and the circumstances of the case, a Panel may find it helpful to 
seek further contextual guidance in other provisions of the TBT Agreement, for 
example, those pertaining to standards, international standards and conformity 
assessment procedure, in delimiting the contours of the term ‘technical regulation’. It 
may also be relevant for a panel to examine supplementary means of interpretation 
such as negotiating history of the TBT Agreement and the nature of claims that have 
been brought by the complainants. Indeed, a determination of whether a measure 
constitutes a technical regulation ‘must be made in the light of the characteristics of 
the measure at issue and the circumstances of the case’.32  
From this paragraph, it seems that the Appellate Body has in mind a more appropriate 
approach to evaluate whether or not a measure is a technical regulation. In view of the intense 
confusion and uncertainty on what constitutes a technical regulation,  it is unfortunate that the 
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Appellate Body did not demonstrate how to put into practice the new approach in EC- Seal 
products.  
III. The Place of Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in the TBT 
One unsettled question concerning the regulatory scope of the TBT is the extent to which 
production and process methods (PPMs) fall under the purview of either “technical 
regulation” or “standard” and are thus subject to relevant TBT disciplines. Annex 1.1 
provides that a technical regulation covers not only product characteristics, but also “their 
related processes and production methods”. The meaning of the phrase ‘their related PPMs’ 
had not been examined in any WTO disputes prior to EC – Seal Products.33 In EC – Seal 
Products, the Appellate Body interpreted “their related PPMs” to indicate that the subject 
matter of a technical regulation may consist of a PPM that is related to product 
characteristics. In order to determine whether a measure lays down “related” PPMs, a Panel 
will have to examine whether the PPMs at issue have a sufficient nexus to the characteristics 
of a product in order to be considered related to those characteristics. 34  In EC – Seal 
Products, Norway argued that the EC seal regime has laid down a related PPM through the 
IC and MRM exceptions. The Appellate Body refused to consider the issue because the Panel 
had made no findings on this issue. The Appellate Body also warned that “the line between 
PPMs that fall, and those that do not fall, within the scope of the TBT Agreement raises 
important systemic issues”.35 Since the Appellate Body ducked the PPM issue in EC – Seal 
Products, it remains to be seen how broad this “sufficient nexus” between PPMs and product 
characteristics will be interpreted in future disputes.  
How to interpret the phrase “their related PPMs” in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement is a 
controversial issue. A textual reading of Annex 1.1 may indicate that both product-related 
PPMs (PR-PPMs) and non-product-related PPMs (NPR-PPMs) are covered by the definition 
of technical regulation. If product characteristics are defined broadly to include not only 
physical characteristics but also some non-physical characteristics, the types of PPMs are not 
the problem and even some NPR-PPMs could be  covered by the definition of technical 
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regulation so long as they are related to product characteristics.36 In this connection, it should 
be emphasized that nothing in the text of Annex 1.1 shows that product characteristics only 
refer to physical characteristics. Furthermore, since only “related PPMs” are covered by the 
definition of technical regulation, one necessary inference must be that not all NPR- PPMs 
are covered because they are not related to, i.e., have a sufficient nexus with, product 
characteristics.37 Arguably, prescriptions of harvesting methods for tuna which do not leave 
physical traces can be regarded as having a sufficient nexus to the characteristics of a product 
so as to qualify as a “related PPM”. By contrast, general policy considerations such as labor 
standards or human rights conditions that are not specifically related to the production of 
specific products would not qualify as “related PPMs” in the sense of the TBT definition. 
Although a textural interpretation may indicate that the dichotomy of PR-PPMs and NPR-
PPMs is not really relevant to the interpretation of “their related PPMs” in Annex 1 of the 
TBT Agreement. This interpretation is at odds with the prevailing view that the phrase “their 
related” in the definition of technical regulation intentionally qualify the scope of PPMs, i.e., 
only PR-PPMs are covered by the TBT Agreement. 38 NPR-PPMs which leave no physical 
traces in final products are not covered by the TBT Agreement. In other words, only physical 
product characteristics are relevant. The negotiating history of the TBT Agreement seems to 
support such an understanding. The Standards Code concluded at the end of Tokyo Round did 
not cover standards that are based on PPM criteria, regardless of whether or not they related 
to the product. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, Mexico proposed to insert “their 
related” before the processes and production methods. In introducing its proposal, Mexico 
made it clear that the intent was to exclude PPMs unrelated to the characteristics of a product 
from the coverage of the TBT Agreement, so that the TBT Agreement only addresses a 
narrow selection of PPMs. Mexico’s proposal was adopted in the final TBT text. 39 In line 
with this understanding, requirements that products should be harvested in a certain way to 
meet environmental standards, i.e., non-product-related PPMs (NPR-PPMs) such as the 
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forthcoming in World Trade Review, at p. 7.  
38 WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment at the WTO (Geneva, 2004), at p. 17; OECD Secretariat, “Processes 
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import ban at US – Tuna I and US – Shrimp, are not technical regulations since they have no 
impact on the physical qualities or performance or quality of the product.  
Similarly, it is argued that voluntary NPR- PPMs also fall outside of the definition of 
“standard” in the TBT. In the final TBT text, only the word “related” is inserted before “the 
processes and production methods” in the definition of “standard”, in contrast to “their 
related” in the definition of “technical regulation”. The negotiating history shows that the 
omission of “their” in the standard definition does not imply a different meaning.  Indeed, 
Mexico proposed to align the definition of “standard” with that of “technical regulation” 
towards the end of Uruguay Round. All but one of the delegations involved that expressed an 
opinion stated that they were prepared to accept Mexico’s proposal as an improvement to the 
text.40 This negotiating history strongly indicates that the word “related” in the definition of 
standard refers to “related to product characteristics”, similar to the definition of technical 
regulation.  
Although the negotiating history appears to support a narrow interpretation of “their related 
process and production methods” to refer to only PR-PPMs, it is not clear whether the 
Appellate Body will adhere to such an interpretation in future dispute settlement proceedings. 
To begin with, if NPR- PPMs are not covered by the TBT, then technical regulations and 
standards based on NPR-PPMs are only scrutinized under the GATT 1994. The irony of this 
exclusion is that concerns over the protectionist or unilateralist abuse of NPR-PPMs might 
actually be allayed by subjecting such measures to the TBT Agreement. 41  Second, the 
negotiating history of the PPMs in Annex 1 is not entirely unambiguous. In any case, the 
Appellate Body seldom resorts to traveaux préparatoires because they are only a 
supplementary means of interpretation. 42  As shown above, using the strong textualist 
approach set forth in the VCLT, measures addressing NPR-PPMs could be regarded as being 
“related” to product characteristics.43   
The second sentence of both definitions of technical regulation and standard in Annex 1 deals 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements. The second 
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sentence of each definition reads: “[a technical regulation or standard] may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method”. Reading the second sentence 
literally, it seems that, as long as PR-PPMs and NPR-PPMs are reflected only in product 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements, they are covered by the TBT Agreement. 
However, an alternative view holds that the second sentence should be read in light of the 
first sentence.44 Even though the word “related” was omitted from the phrase “…as they 
apply to a product, process or production methods” in the second sentence, the second 
sentence should be read consistently with the first sentence. In other words, the second 
sentence is only illustrative of the first and NPR-PPMs are excluded from both the first and 
the second sentences of the two definitions. This interpretation is contested by an opposite 
view that the TBT Agreement applies to all labeling requirements that fall within the 
definitions of either a technical regulation or a standard. The second sentence is “additional to 
the first sentence and not merely illustrative”.45 This debate also took place in discussions of 
Item 3(b) on the agenda of CTE working program which focuses on eco-labeling schemes 
and measures and their relationship to the provisions of the TBT Agreement. In CTE 
proceedings, divergent views were expressed but no consensus was reached.46  
The debate on the scope of PPMs in the second sentence of the definitions on technical 
regulation and standard has become increasingly irrelevant in practice. In 1995, with the 
purpose of clarifying the coverage of the Agreement with respect to labelling requirements, 
the TBT Committee took the following decision:  
In conformity with Article 2.9 of the Agreement, Members are obliged to notify all 
mandatory labelling requirements that are not based substantially on a relevant 
international standard and that may have a significant effect on the trade of other 
Members.  That obligation is not dependent upon the kind of information which is 
provided on the label, whether it is in the nature of a technical specification or not.47 
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Similarly, in the 1st Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement, the TBT Committee agreed that: 
…without prejudice to the view of Members concerning the coverage and application 
of the Agreement, the obligation to publish notices of draft standards containing 
voluntary labeling requirements under paragraph L of the Code is not dependent upon 
the kind of information provided on the label.’48  
These decisions have provided some clarification on the transparency obligations for labeling 
schemes irrespective of the information contained, including NPR-PPMs. In practice, many 
WTO Members notify the WTO its eco-labeling programs containing NPR- PPMs. In the 2nd 
Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement’s implementation in November 2000, the TBT 
Committee reiterated the importance of any labeling requirements being consistent with the 
disciplines of the TBT.49 Nevertheless, these decisions avoided the issue of whether the TBT 
Agreement covers a labelling scheme based on NPR- PPMs. The prevailing view appears to 
be that labelling requirements, regardless of the information contained, should be scrutinized 
under the TBT Agreement. This interpretation is now largely confirmed in the WTO dispute 
settlement processes.50 In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body stated that the second sentence 
“simply gives certain examples of product characteristics, which are referred to in the first 
sentence”.51 In other words, it is not really relevant what kind of information the marking or 
labelling provides or whether it is related to PR-PPMs or NPR-PPMs,  the labelling scheme 
as such constitutes “product characteristics” and are covered by the definition. The Panel in 
EC- Trade Marks and Geographical Indications and US – Tuna II confirmed this approach.52 
In US – Tuna II, the US “dolphin-safe” labelling requirements for tuna products were based 
on NPR-PPM criteria of fishing processes. The complainant Mexico supported the 
applicability of the TBT Agreement to the US labeling scheme and argued that the US 
labeling program was in violation of Article 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. The 
Panel was satisfied that “the measures at issue lay down labelling requirements, as they apply 
to a product, process or production method and that the subject-matter of the measures 
therefore falls within the scope of the second sentence of Annex 1.1”.53 The Appellate Body 
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upheld the Panel’s overall determination that the US “dolphin-safe” labelling scheme based 
on a NPR-PPM constituted a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT.54   
The prevailing view as confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body seems to be compelling for 
two reasons. First, the word “also” in the second sentence of both definitions clearly indicates 
that the second sentence is additional to the first sentence. Second, different from the first 
sentence where the debates on whether NPR- PPMs should be covered led to the insertion of 
“related” in the first sentence of the definition, the negotiators did not insert “related” before 
the “process and production methods” in the second sentence. Such an omission provides 
strong textual evidence that the second sentence covers a wide range of PPMs.  
IV. Conclusion 
The definition of technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement is not free from 
ambiguity. In EC- Seal Products, the Appellate Body held that in determining whether a 
measure is a technical regulation, a panel must seek to identify the measure’s “integral and 
essential” aspects, and then analyze the weight and relevance of the essential and integral 
elements of the measure as an integrated whole. I submit that this seemingly sound analytical 
approach has led to an arbitrary conclusion in EC- Seal Products.  
Despite its arbitrariness, the Appellate Body’s approach in characterizing the EC seal regime 
shows its efforts to put some limit to what product characteristic means, especially when the 
term is followed by another category of measures, PPMs, which are also covered by the 
definition of technical regulation. In turn, the TBT Agreement will likely apply to a narrower 
set of measures than people previously assumed. This leads to an even deeper question: what 
special characteristics of a technical regulation distinguish it from other regulations and make 
it subject to more detailed obligations in the TBT Agreement, in addition to the GATT 1994? 
The answer to this question will in turn help us understand the scope of technical regulation 
in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body has laid out 
the analytical approach that it will adopt to evaluate whether or not a measure is a technical 
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regulation in future disputes.55 It seems that we will have to wait for the next case before we 
have a clearer understanding of what measures constitute technical regulations in the TBT 
Agreement.  
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